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Executive Summary 
The history of East African cooperation is one of rise (1900 to 1977), fall (1977 to 1993) and recovery (1993 to the present); from a full common market to nothing and, now, to the teething problems of a customs union. 
The current EAC development strategy envisions the conclusion of a Customs Union (CU) Protocol 
by 2003 so as to have the CU operational by December 2004. There has been some progress in 
freeing the EAC trade regime, yet disputes are frequent on tariffs and other trade levies, and agreement 
on a common external tariff regime is yet to materialise. Progress is slow in the area of elimination 
of non-tariff barriers (NTBs) to trade, such as bureaucratic procedures, prevalence of police 
roadblocks, and customs clearance delays. 
However, fast progress is seen in harmonisation of monetary and fiscal policies, viz: 
• Convertibility of EAC currencies; 
8 Standardisation of corporate tax rates, currently at 30 percent; 
• Harmonisation of value added tax (VAT) rates; and 
• Institutionalisation of Finance Ministers' pre-budget and post budget consultations and regular 
sharing of information on budgets, tax proposals, trade and economic performance. 
There has also been considerable success on the identification of regional projects in infrastructure 
(roads, telecommunications, power, railways and waterways). 
Debt levels in East Africa have exploded in the course of the last twenty years or so. Most of the 
debt is long term and is either public/government or publicly guaranteed, and the greatest portion is 
owed to multilateral organisations. Debts have to be repaid in the designated currencies or in a 
universally convertible currency. This has pushed countries to insist on being paid for their exports 
in those currencies instead of local ones, thus inhibiting the use of local currencies and acting as a 
brake to regional trade. In this way, external debt can be inimical to regional integration. 
The EAC treaty enjoins partner states to work towards closer macroeconomic convergence. To 
operationalise this, the 2001-2005 EAC Development Strategy has urged member states to maintain 
market determined exchange rates and pursue policies that will achieve monetary stability and 
growth in order to lay the foundation for introducing a single currency. The current convertibility of 
the three currencies enhances their acceptability in each of the countries, obviating the use of scarce 
foreign exchange and releasing foreign exchange resources that could be utilised for debt liquidation. 
It is generally felt that the benefit-cost ratio of East African integration is positive, even for less 
advantaged members. Fear of an immediate loss of tax revenue looms in many a policy maker's 
mind but a close examination of this 'cost' shows that it is minuscule because of the very low levels 
of tariff revenue from EAC trade. In addition, given the differing initial conditions in the three 
countries, the principle of asymmetry has been recognised by the EAC Treaty to address variances 
in the implementation of measures in an economic integration process. 
The terms of external borrowing do seem to have improved, with the coming of regional integration, 
having a positive impact on debt. To augment this gain, there should be a debt forum set up which 
could serve as a collective bargaining agent with international creditors on debt, unlike the current 
situation whereby a debtor country faces a barrage of creditors at the London and Paris 'Clubs'. 
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The formalisation of regional integration of the three countries saw a marked decline in debt stress, 
but there are no significant corollary changes in the observed human development trends. Although 
direct effects on debt can be achieved by regional collective bargaining with donors, the effects of 
greater integration on socio-economic phenomena and the debt are likely to be indirect. While 
more productive, efficient and competitive economies earn more foreign exchange to ease the burden 
of debt servicing, it is prosperity arising from a larger market that will ensure countries have more 
resources to allocate to social sectors like education and health. 
Progress in regional integration is slow and seems to be haunted by the spectre of past failure that 
needs to be overcome. East Africa's macroeconomic convergence programme is on course. The 
findings of this study suggest that regional integration can be a means of achieving development, 
fighting indebtedness and enhancing the standard of life. 
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Introduction 
Between 1900 and 1967, the East African countries of Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania were able to establish an East African Community with a shared currency; common external tariffs; harmonised excise duties; common services in taxation, railways, harbours, posts, 
telecommunications, airline, research, examinations, certification, meteorology and statistics, and 
an appeal court. There was also free mobility of capital, goods, labour, persons and services. This 
arrangement collapsed acrimoniously in 1977, in part, due to Tanzania's consistent refusal to 
recognise the Idi Amin military regime of Uganda in place since 1971, making it impossible for the 
Authority/Summit to give the required leadership, but also due to incessant squabbles over the 
physical location of assets. These and other problems were driven largely by ideological differences 
that undermined the political will for regional cooperation. 
Nevertheless, a few institutions, namely the East African Development Bank (EADB), the Lake 
Victoria Fisheries Organisation (LVFO) and the Inter-University Council for East Africa (IUCEA), 
survived the trauma. These buttressed the lingering good will to come up with the Mediation 
Agreement of 1984 that, while finalising the division of the assets and liabilities of the defunct East 
African Community, provided for the exploration of ways and means of strengthening regional 
cooperation. This led to the 1993 agreement to establish the Permanent Tripartite Commission for 
East African Cooperation whose Secretariat was set up in Arusha, Tanzania, in 1996. This 
Commission evolved into the new EAC with the signing of the Treaty for the Establishment of the 
East African Community (EAC) on 30 November 1999. The Treaty came into force on 7 July 2000 
and the Community was officially inaugurated on 15 January 2001, covering an area of 1.8 million 
square kilometres and a population of some 86 million. 
This paper seeks to establish the impact of regional integration on the debt crisis. The specific 
objectives are to: 
• Enhance the understanding of integration and debt in East African countries; 
• Study the relationship between integration, debt and human development generally; 
• Assess the responsiveness of the debt crisis to regional integration; 
• Document costs and benefits of regional integration; and 
• Appraise the institutional preparedness to undertake the tasks at hand. 
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The Current State of Sub-Regional Integration 
1.1 The State of Integration 
The EAC development strategy envisions the conclusion of a Customs Union (CU) protocol by 20031 so that the CU will be operational by December 2004. 
According to the EAC Treaty, the broad objective of the Community is, to develop policies and 
programmes aimed at widening and deepening co-operation among the Partner States in political, 
economic, social and cultural fields, research and technology, defence, security and legal and judicial 
affairs, for their mutual benefit.2 
In order to reach this goal, the treaty envisages "the establishment of a Customs Union, a Common 
Market, subsequently a Monetary Union and ultimately a Political Federation"3 Hence, a Customs 
Union (CU) is "the entry point of the Community".4 
Success indicators for a CU are abolition of interstate tariffs, that is a Free Trade Area (FTA) and a 
common external tariff. Performance in these respects will be assessed and, in particular, trade 
accomplishment in the EAC will be examined, since it is at the core of economic integration. Such 
integration can be defined as a process and a means by which a group of countries strives to develop 
and increase its welfare levels, encompassing reduction of poverty, indebtedness and economic 
malaise. It recognises that partnership between countries can achieve these goals in a more efficient 
way than unilateral or independent pursuance of policy in each country. It can be postulated that 
meaningful regional cooperation and integration will help arrest poverty and the external debt 
crisis in these partner nations. 
There has been little progress in freeing the EAC trade regime. Considered to be more developed, 
Kenya offers a 90 percent tariff reduction of general duty rates on goods emanating from Uganda 
and Tanzania, while the other two give 80 percent reduction on Kenyan goods. Disputes are frequent, 
though sometimes mute. For example, in November 2001, Kenyan textile exporters complained of 
the 25 percent duty imposed by Tanzania at a time when Kenya levied only 3.5 percent. Another 
case is of Uganda imposing what is in reality a 10 percent excise duty over and above the normal 
duty, arguing that it was a withholding tax to ensure tax compliance. 
Progress in the sphere of common external tariff (CET), to level the playing field and discourage 
trans-shipment of goods, has not been spectacular either. Currently, Kenya's top tariff is 35 percent 
and that of both Tanzania and Uganda is 25 percent. For CET, Kenya and Tanzania proposed a tariff 
band of 25 percent but Uganda suggested 15 percent to comply with its commitment to the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), arguing that a higher rate would lower compliance, impair 
competitiveness and induce smuggling. A compromise of 20 percent seems likely.5 
1.2 Sectoral Progress 
As discussed above, progress in the area of liberalisation of intra-EAC trade and agreement on 
common external tariff has been slow and agonising. Slow progress is evident also in the 
harmonisation of various codes, such as competition policies, customs, and investment codes. Rapid 
progress, though, has been achieved in the adoption of a standardised single entry customs document. 
f 
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Negligible progress has been made in the elimination of non tariff barriers (NTBs) to trade, such as 
bureaucratic procedures, prevalence of police roadblocks, customs clearance delays, export duties, 
licensing requirements, strict interpretation of health and security concerns and application of rules 
of origin, pre-shipment requirements, double taxation, etc. 
The EAC Development Strategy for the period 1997 to 2000 aimed at the development of closer 
cooperation between the member countries in the fiscal, monetary, immigration, infrastructure and 
service fields/' Significantly rapid progress has been made in the area of the establishment of standards 
for locally manufactured products, with 91 out of 207 East African standards already agreed upon 
and notified to the World Trade Organisation (WTO).7 Other policies being implemented include 
enhancement of the free movement of people by the introduction of a passport valid throughout 
East Africa. 
Fast progress is seen in the harmonisation of monetary and fiscal policies, viz: 
• Advances in the development of a macroeconomic framework for the region to guide 
towards economic convergence and macroeconomic stability; 
• Convertibility of EAC currencies; 
• Standardisation of corporate tax rates, currently at 30 percent; 
• Harmonisation of value added tax (VAT) rates, which are now 17 percent in Uganda, 
18 percent in Kenya and 20 percent in Tanzania; and 
• Institutionalisation of Finance Ministers' pre-budget and post budget consultations and 
regular sharing of information on budgets, tax proposals, trade and economic performance. 
There has been considerable success in the identification of regional projects in infrastructure, 
including East African Digital Transmission, Power Master Plan, Postal Automation, Road Network, 
etc. Similarly, effort has paid off in the involvement of the private sector and the civil society 
through such bodies as the East African Business Council, East African Trade Union Council, East 
Africa Law Society, and the East African Youth Council; as well as parastatals and corporate 
organisations, such as the East African Investment Promotion Authorities Organisation, the Joint 
Research Council for East Africa, the East African Tourism Council, the East African 
Communications Regulators, and the Postal and Telecommunications Companies Organisation. 
These bodies act as lobbyists and facilitators of the involvement of major stakeholders. They are 
also targets for sensitisation on the salutary nature of regional cooperation and integration. They 
are, first and foremost, activists and protagonists in policy harmonisation and the development of 
regional infrastructure. For the latter, there are completed, ongoing and planned regional projects, 
as detailed in Table 1. 
11 Regional Integration and Debt in East Africa 
Table 1: Regional Infrastructure Development Projects 
PROJECT ACTIVITY STATUS FUNDING FUNDING 
SOURCES 
East African 
Digital 
Transmission 
(EAD TP) 
Providing wide band 
network/backbone 
capacities 
Progress in the Kenya and 
Uganda commponents; 
negotiations stage for the 
Tanzania component 
US $ 65 million Patner 
states, EIB, 
EADB,World 
Bank, 
Cross 
Border 
Telecomm 
Connectivity 
Directly connect 
East African 
Boarder towns by 
telephone links 
Five boarder towns 
covered evaluation of the 
completed phase 
East African 
Road 
Network 
Studies, design 
and prioritisation 
Five road corridors ready 
for implementation, one 
quarter of funding secured 
US $4 Billion Patner States, 
World Bank, EU, 
ADB, KFW 
East African 
Postal 
Automation 
Tendering Suppliers identified EADB 
Railway 
Sub-Sector 
Studies Terms of reference 
approaved 
-
Civil Aviation 
Safety 
Studies Selection of experts US $ 1 090 000 Member states, 
EIB, ICAO, 
Inland 
Waterways 
Study on state of 
Lake Victoria ports 
Awaiting confirmation of 
funding 
- IMO and France 
Energy 
Preparation of East 
African Energy 
Master Plan 
Tendering for the study 
-
World Bank 
Source: EAC, EAC Annual Report 1899/2000 and idem, The EAC Development - means information not available 
It should be noted that most of the regional projects are at the advanced planning/preparation stage 
and that about 50 percent of them are being implemented. All have immediate capacity to increase 
external debt since they are, at least partly, denominated in foreign currency, are public, and are 
largely donor funded. Each project's budget is "split amongst Member States" so that such debts 
are "portions" or "components" which are the individual country's own,8 with each left to sort out 
"outstanding issues" with the donor.9 This may give the impression of disjointed projects in pursuit 
of a donor driven agenda. 
Slow progress in the elimination of non tariff barriers (NTBs) to trade and harmonisation of 
competition policies, customs, and investment codes act as restraints to intra-community trade to 
the extent that they inhibit regional independence and exacerbate external dependence, including 
external debt. On the other hand, improvement in infrastructure has an ameliorating effect on debt. 
1.3 Funding Sources 
The financing of the institutions of the EAC is done largely through equal budgetary contributions 
of the member states. The current budget is US$ 4.2 million. 
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As a body corporate with perpetual succession, the Community has power to acquire, hold, manage 
and dispose of land and to perform any of the functions conferred upon it by the EAC Treaty that 
are necessary or desirable for the performance of those functions. In this regard, the Community 
has technical assistance and donations by some development partners such as the German Agency 
for Technical Cooperation (GTZ). 
For the future, some money could be raised under self-financing mechanisms from: 
• Activities undertaken by the Community such as the sale its publications; 
• Rental of extra office space in the headquarters building now under construction in Arusha, 
Tanzania; 
• Bequests, grants and gifts by well wishers; 
A Community tax (0.05 percent) of value of international trade by partner states; 
• A Community tax imposed on a major common resource, such as Lake Victoria's fish; and 
• Acquisition of shares in such COMESA initiated coiporations as Africa Trade Insurance 
Agency (ATIA) and COMESA Telecommunications (COMTEL). 
With proper management, regional integration need not generate new forms of indebtedness within 
or among member states. 
1.4 The Infrastructure Development-Debt Nexus 
While public infrastructural investment incurs debt, it also makes for efficient trade, thus enhancing 
value addition in exports and reduction in import cost. The macro effect is reduction in overall 
national debt. Thus a way out of debt creation that would highlight the positive, while avoiding the 
negative, debt related effects of infrastructure development, is the involvement of the private sector 
by way of equity and portfolio investment in infrastructure through mechanisms such as build-
operate-transfer (BOT) and build-own-operate (BOO). 
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Economic Integration In The EAC 
Despite signing the EAC trade protocol member states' performance with respect to the quantitative indicators and prescribed standards, movement towards economic convergence and debt reduction seems to be slow. Member states are still grappling with unsustainable 
debt, inflation rates, budget deficits and adoption of a market oriented approach to monetary policy. 
2.1 Economic Convergence and Debt within EAC 
Economic integration efforts in East Africa date back to 1900 and collapsed for a while between 
1977 and 1999. The member states have tried to improve trading relations among themselves through 
the elimination of tariffs and non-tariff barriers to trade. This relationship has been complemented 
by monetary development including a convertibility of currencies. This has helped in the reduction 
of financial transaction costs, elimination of exchange control and exchange rate risks, and stimulation 
of regional trade and economic development. 
However, the debt burden of the EAC has not been addressed through an explicit regional policy. 
Member states have individually negotiated with the creditors in terms of loan procurement and 
debt repayments. Uganda and Tanzania were among the first few qualifiers for the Structural 
Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) and the Heavily Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) initiative and are 
also among the first to have their completed Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) approved 
by the Bretton Woods Institutions. A number of internal and external factors have contributed to the 
inability of the region to meet the convergence criteria for monetary integration as a solution to the 
current debt crisis. 
2.2 Common Currency 
The ideal is a common currency for a common market since this reduces transaction costs. But, the 
experience in East Africa is that it was easier to destroy the common East African Shilling than to 
rebuild it. The EAC Treaty enjoins partner states to work towards closer macroeconomic 
convergence.10 To operationalise this, the 2001 to 2005 EAC Development Strategy has urged 
Member States to "maintain market determined exchange rates...[and] pursue policies that will 
achieve monetary stability and growth...[in order to] lay the foundation for introducing a single 
currency"11 
A good sign is the complete convertibility of the East African currencies. But a modicum of stability 
in such exchange rates is necessary for a non-disruptive move to a single currency. For the time 
being, the exchange rate regime shows signs of volatility in that the real exchange rate of the 
Uganda Shilling has recently been appreciating at some 6 percent per annum, while the Kenya 
Shilling has been appreciating at about 1 percent and the Tanzania Shilling has been depreciating at 
around 1 percent.12 This realignment of the currencies will enable them seek their equilibrium 
levels, smoothing the path to a formal exchange rate mechanism and the ultimate establishment of 
a common currency by 2010. The current convertibility of the three currencies enhances their 
acceptability in each of the countries, encouraging traders and others to quote their wares in local 
currencies and obviating the use of scarce foreign exchange. This has the immediate effect of releasing 
foreign exchange resources that could be utilised for debt liquidation. Due to its convenience, use 
of local currency facilitates intra-EAC trade thus ameliorating the debt crisis. 
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2.3 Intra-EAC Trade 
Table 2: Intra-EAC Exports, 2000 (US$ millions) 
Exports 
\ to 
Exports 
from 
KENYA TANZANIA UGANDA TOTAL EXPORTS 
FROM 
Kenya 85 350 435 
Tanzania 38 25 63 
Uganda 1 5 6 
TOTAL 
EXPORTS TO 39 90 375 
Source: IMF (2001), Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook, Washington, D.C., 
Kenya is the dominant player, exporting some US$ 435 million (most of it to Uganda) and importing 
US$ 39 million. Uganda and Tanzania have imports many times in excess of their exports. Kenya 
enjoys a favourable intra-EAC balance of trade, Tanzania a moderate deficit and Uganda a 
considerable deficit. Yet, intra-EAC trade is a low proportion of the member countries total trade. 
For example, most of Uganda's trade is with the European Union, Kenya being the destination for 
only 4.6 percent of Uganda's exports and origin of only 12.4 percent of imports. Similarly, Tanzania's 
exports to Kenya account for less than 3 percent and Tanzania takes about 10.2 percent of her total 
imports from Kenya. Uganda's share of Kenyan exports is around 16.1 percent and Tanzania takes 
9.9 percent.13 The trade canvas for East Africa is such that intra-EAC trade (exports plus imports) 
accounts for only 3.2 percent of Uganda's international trade and 7.6 percent of Kenya's and 
Tanzania's.14 So, there is a lot of potential for trade expansion by way of intra-EAC production of 
goods that can compete with those coming from outside the region. 
The dominance of Kenya is due to a relatively large and diversified economy - with a GDP of over 
US$ 9.7 billion as compared to Tanzania's US$ 7.8 billion and Uganda's US$ 7.5 billion. However, 
the degree of regional integration, as indicated by the share of intra-EAC trade to each country's 
total external trade, does not confirm this economic dominance since Kenya ties with Tanzania at 
7.6 percent. 
One would expect that the debt crisis (debt service as a proportion of exports) would be negatively 
related to the degree of integration. With respect to the EAC, this is true in the case of Tanzania, 
where the degree of integration is relatively high and the debt service ratio is relatively low (15.5 
percent). It also holds true for Uganda where the degree of integration is low and the debt service 
ratio is high (23.7 percent). This is in spite of Uganda's HIPC status, suggesting that HIPC 
mechanisms are having minimal impact on debt relief. For Kenya, however, the debt service ratio 
is high (26.7 percent) just as the degree of integration is relatively high. The impact of regional 
integration on the debt crisis can, therefore, be judged to be ameliorative, on the balance of 
probabilities. 
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p 
Debt, Trade and Monetary and Fiscal Harmonisation 
3.1 The Region's Economic Indicators 
The record indicates an improvement in roughly 80 percent of the indicators since 1996, the year of operationalisation of the EAC. Some economic indicators are presented in Table 3. 
Table 3: EAC Countries' Economic Indicators 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
KENYA 
Inflation (%) 14.1 14.4 20.9 46.0 28.8 1.6 9.0 11.2 6.6 3.5 6.2 
Fiscal Deficit 
(% GDP) -6.8 -1.7 -5.8 -3.9 -1.1 0.1 -3.2 -1.7 0.0 0.0 0.2 
Reserves 
(months of imports) 0.9 2.1 2.5 1.2 2.5 2.4 2.4 2.8 
Domestic Savings 19.9 19.9 13.4 19.3 19.5 18.1 19.7 15.0 13.1 13.4 11.6 
Real GDP Growth 4.2 2.1 0.5 0.2 3.0 4.8 4.6 2.4 1.8 1.4 -0.3 
TANZANIA 
Inflation (%) 22.2 23.1 25.3 35.0 27.7 21.1 16.1 8.9 7.2 7.8 
Fiscal Deficit 
(% GDP) -3.2 -1.9 -2.2 -3.5 -3.1 -3.3 0.2 0.2 -1.0 -3.8 -0.4 
Reserves 
(months of imports) 1.4 1.1 2.0 1.4 2.3 3.5 2.9 3.5 
Domestic Savings 20.9 21.0 22.2 17.9 15.2 1.9 3.0 2.1 2.3 0.2 0.3 
Real GDP Growth 6.2 2.8 1.8 0.4 1.4 3.6 4.2 4.0 4.0 4.8 4.7 
UGANDA 
Inflation (%) 26.9 27.7 54.5 5.1 10.0 6.6 5.4 10.4 3.4 3.8 5.5 
Fiscal Deficit 
(% GDP) -4.3 -4.5 -6.3 -2.6 -2.9 -2.7 -2.0 -1.5 -0.5 -1.3 -3.7 
Reserves 
(months of imports) 0.7 2.4 4.2 3.8 3.8 4.5 4.5 4.8 
Domestic Savings 6.2 10.2 10.5 12.4 14.6 15.6 15.8 17.3 14.6 14.4 13.5 
Real GDP Growth 5.5 5.2 4.5 6.3 10.4 8.4 4.7 5.3 7.5 5.0 4.6 
Sources: EAC Secretariat (January 2002); and ADB, African Development Report 2001 
Though direct effects on debt can be achieved by regional collective bargaining with the donors, 
the effects of greater integration on socio-economic phenomena and the debt are likely to be indirect, 
rather than direct. By making the economies more productive, efficient and competitive, countries 
earn more foreign exchange to ease the burden of debt servicing. If they become prosperous due to 
a larger market, countries have more resources to allocate to social sectors like education and 
health. Therefore, regional integration is an important step towards prosperity, including being a 
tool to solve indebtedness in Eastern Africa. 
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3.2 East Africa's Debt Profiles 
Despite being early qualifiers for the HIPC and PRSPs, both Uganda and Tanzania continue to have 
unsustainable debt burdens. Kenya is also a poor and heavily indebted country though it hasn't 
received HIPC debt relief or completed a PRSP. 
Tanzania has recently enforced health care user fees against a background of HIV/AIDS accounting 
for almost 50 percent of hospitalisation and estimates suggest that it will have an unsustainable debt 
burden until 2007. Although, Uganda received an unusually high rate of debt reduction from the 
World Bank and was able to double its primary school enrolments, it is yet to attain quality education 
and health in a context of high external debt service costs. 
Table 4: Debt Profiles for EAC countries (US$ million, unless indicated otherwise) 
1970 1980 1990 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
KENYA 
Total Debt Stock 478 3 387 7 058 7 111 7 202 7 412 6 931 6 603 6 943 6 562 
Long Term debt (LDOD) 409 2 493 5 642 5 846 6 119 6 405 6 060 5 550 5 888 5 604 
Public and Publicly 
Guaranteed 321 2 056 4 762 5 246 5 589 5 960 5 685 5 225 5 608 5 385 
Concessional/EDT (%) 35.6 20.2 33.7 43.5 47.1 52.3 56.8 57.0 59.4 63.1 
Multilateral/EDT (%) 8.0 18.7 35.3 36.8 38.4 39.4 42.5 43.2 43.2 44.0 
TANZANIA 
Total Debt Stock (EDT) 212 5 322 6 451 6 791 7 235 7 406 7 362 7 129 7 633 7 968 
Long Term Debt (LDOD) 188 3 381 5 793 5 820 6 140 6 247 6 127 6 056 6 465 6 628 
Public and Publicly 
Guaranteed 173 3 297 5 782 5 808 6 128 6 204 6 082 6015 6 428 6 595 
Concessional/EDT (%) 76.8 50.6 53.6 59.1 60.4 60.1 60.9 71.5 72.4 72.5 
Multilateral/EDT (%) 18.0 10.6 30.7 35.5 36.8 37.8 39.1 41.0 41.2 41.1 
UGANDA * 
Total Debt Stock (EDT) 152 689 2 583 3 029 3 372 3 573 3 675 3 913 4 016 4 077 
Long Term debt (LDOD) 152 537 2 161 2 599 2 869 3 062 3 151 3 404 3 482 3 564 
Public and Publicly 
Guaranteed 152 537 2 161 2 599 2 869 3 062 3 151 3 404 3 482 3 564 
Concessional/EDT (%) 71.3 36.9 56.2 70.3 72.9 77.5 78.3 76.1 79.5 80.4 
Multilateral/EDT (%) 12.6 11.5 49.2 57.0 59.7 61.8 62.2 61.6 60.9 62.8 
Source: World Bank (2001), Global Development Finance, Washington DC, pp 312-315, 532-535, 564-567. 
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In 1999 Tanzania had the largest stock of total debt (US$ 8 billion), followed by Kenya (US$ 7 
billion) and Uganda (US$ 4 billion). In all cases the value of debt has exploded in the course of the 
last twenty years or so, although seeming to level off for Kenya from a peak in 1995. Most of the 
debt is long term (maturity of one year or more) and is either public/government or publicly 
guaranteed. Over 40 percent of this debt is owed to multilateral organisations, 60 percent in the 
case of Uganda. Concessional debts (loans with an original grant element of 25 percent or more) 
account for around 50 percent of Kenya's total, 70 percent of Tanzania's and 80 percent of Uganda's. 
Some of the long-term debts are owed by one EAC member country to another. Two known examples 
are given. The first arose from the break up of the jointly owned common services organisations, 
with assets left in the country where they were in 1977. The Mediation Agreement of 1984 established 
that Kenya had positive net community assets and, therefore, owed Tanzania and Uganda. That 
debt stood at K£ 63.1 million in 1994 and had declined to K£ 42.3 million (US$ 10.8 million) by 
1999.15 This amounts to about 0.2 percent of Kenya's debt or some 0.1 percent of the combined 
Tanzania and Uganda debt. There is no evidence that these EAC related debts are having a perceptible 
effect on the external debt of the three countries. 
The second interstate debt came about due to the war liberating Uganda from the Amin dictatorship 
in 1979.16 Tanzania spent some US$ 123 million on its army and equipment and also on training the 
various Ugandan groups opposed to the Amin regime. By a 1998 agreement, this was adjusted to 
US$ 95 million. To date, Uganda has paid US$ 64 million, leaving an outstanding debt of US$ 31 
million. Negotiation is underway to have this debt written off 
The currency composition of East African debt is given in Table 5. Comparing, say, 1990 with 
1999, one notes an evolution in the debt portfolio. 
Table 5: Leading Four Debt Currencies (in order of weight in the basket) 
1990 1999 
Kenya • US Dollar 
• Multiple Currency 
• Pound Sterling 
• Japanese Yen 
US Dollar 
• Japanese Yen 
• Multiple Currency 
• French Franc 
Tanzania • US Dollar 
• Pound Sterling 
• Japanese Yen 
• Multiple Currency 
US Dollar 
• Japanese Yen 
• Multiple Currency 
• Special Drawing rights 
Uganda • US Dollar 
• Multiple Currency 
• Pounding Sterling 
• French Franc 
US Dollar 
• Multiple Currency 
• Special Drawing Rights 
• Other Currencies 
Source: World Bank, Global Development Finance 2001 
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In all countries, the dominance of the US Dollar is maintained throughout the decade 1990 to 1999. 
It is noteworthy that, while the British Pound was a key currency in contracting the external debts 
of Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda in the earlier years, it is no longer among the big four. Its position 
seems to have been taken by the Japanese Yen in the case of Kenya and Tanzania and by debt 
repayable in multiple currencies in the case of Uganda. IMF Special Drawing Rights (SDR) has 
been significant for Kenya during the whole period and has also begun to creep into the portfolios 
of Tanzania and Uganda. The French Franc, which was insignificant in the 1970s has been edging 
into the fold and now ranks fourth in the case of Kenya. 
The evolution of the currency composition of East African debt shows a tendency towards 
diversification to avoid dependency on one donor. It also shows attempts to tap non-traditional 
sources of external financing, the French Franc being a case in point as it is usually associated 
mostly with France's former colonies in West and Central Africa. The move to multiple currencies 
and the SDR is a move to make debt portfolio management more flexible but this has its price in 
that Bretton Woods institutions are reluctant to grant debt relief. Another price is that the debts have 
to be repaid in the designated currencies or in a universally convertible currency. This may encourage 
countries to insist on being paid for their exports in those currencies instead of local ones, thus 
inhibiting the use of local currencies and acting as a brake to regional trade. Thus, external debt can 
be inimical to regional integration. 
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^ P f / The EAC and Debt Management 
The new EAC can be said to have become operational with the setting up of the Secretariat in 1996 to oversee the integration initiative. Therefore, this is the cut off date for the 'before' and 'after' in our attempt to assess whether the EAC has made a difference in the debt crisis 
and other outcomes. Such an analysis is casual empiricism in an attempt to compare the situation 
'with' and the situation 'without' the institution. Although the thing that comes before does not 
necessarily cause the thing that comes after, such an indication of sequence is instructive. 
Total debt has declined in the case of Kenya since the coming of the Community, but has risen in 
the cases of Tanzania and Uganda, giving a one third impact. Concessional debt ratio, i.e. loans 
with an original grant element of 25 percent or more.17 has increased in all three countries, indicating 
winning at the borrowing stakes. So, all in all, the terms of external borrowing seem to have improved 
after the coming of regional integration, having a positive impact on debt. 
So far, external debt issues have been a purely national affair with no coordination at the regional 
level. For now, the regional institution that has a mandate on some aspects of debt management is 
the Macroeconomic and Financial Management Institute of Eastern and Southern Africa (MEFMI). 
Formed in 1997, MEFMI's mandate is to improve sustainable human and institutional capacity in 
these areas for central banks and Ministries of Finance and Planning in its ten member countries -
Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Namibia, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and 
Zimbabwe. Since Kenya is currently not a member of MEFMI, the institute does not cover the 
EAC as a whole. 
The closest the EAC Secretariat has come to such coordination is its prescription on a convergence 
criterion for debt service, namely "Undertake debt reduction initiatives and maintaining the fiscal 
burden of servicing the external obligations to less than 15%."18 The actual debt service takes about 
14 percent of government revenue in Kenya and 23 percent in Tanzania.19 The EAC initiative is a 
step in the right direction. At this stage, each of the three countries has the basic institutions and the 
legal framework in place for sound debt management i.e. aid coordination departments in their 
ministries of finance, external debt management divisions in their central banks and parliamentary 
oversight. 
Now that the Community has been constituted, maybe a debt forum under the monetary and financial 
cooperation arrangement should be set up. This could serve as a collective bargaining agent with 
international creditors on debt, unlike the current situation in which a debtor country faces a barrage 
of creditors at the London and Paris 'Clubs'. For a start, the forum could classify the sovereign 
external debts into: 
1 Genuine developmental ones; 
2 Fraudulent ones given for political purposes (e.g. for buying support during the cold 
war era); and 
3 Odious ones used by hard line regimes to suppress basic freedoms of expression, 
assembly, etc, that is, "debt incurred for private rather than public gain and without the 
consent of the poor"20 
This clarification would inform negotiation for arbitration, rescheduling, cancellation, and debt 
reduction initiatives. It would also assist in the monitoring and observance of statutory borrowing 
limits as well as strengthening debt management systems. In this way, regional integration could 
serve as an instrument for collective self reliance for external debt reduction. 
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External debt is not harmful per se because, after all, it is a source of financing to fill resource gaps. 
The problem is the inability to service it due to liquidity or management constraints. There is a good 
understanding of the obligations by the East African countries due to skilful monitoring, accounting 
and auditing. What is deficient is the adoption of a consistent strategy to approach creditors and 
donors to get the best deals in terms of grace period, maturity and interest charged. There is a need 
for capacity building to enable the East African countries to navigate the sphere of 'aidocracy' 
wisely, be proactive and, hence, minimise the incidences in which "many initiatives originate from 
donors with limited policy guidance from the government"21 External borrowings should be put to 
productive use with returns at least equal to the cost of borrowing, so as to ensure debt sustainability. 
Boosting domestic savings and attracting non debt-creating flows, such as foreign direct 
Investment (FDI) and equity funds are ways out of reliance on borrowing. Such investments could 
be stimulated by: 
• Social, political and economic stability; 
• Regional development banks, such as the EADB; and 
• Cross listing of shares and stocks on the Dar es Salaam, Kampala and Nairobi exchanges. 
As one sage prudently put it, this would let us "be happy and live within our means, even if we have 
to boirow to do it with"22 
4.1 Intraregional Payment Mechanisms 
On the payment mechanism in intra-EAC trade, traders in Uganda indicated first preference for 
cash on delivery (54.5 percent), then letters of credit (43.8 percent), suppliers/trade credit (33.3 
percent), and inter-company account transfers (19.4 percent).23 About 65.4 percent of the surveyed 
firms in Kenya are paid, or pay, cash on delivery for intra-EAC trade, although letters of credit and 
suppliers/trade credit are also important modes of payments.24 Trade with Kenya and Tanzania was 
reported by about 60 percent of the Ugandan respondents as being billed in US Dollars as the 
preferred currency, while some 15 percent preference was indicated for either Ugandan or Tanzanian 
Shillings. Kenyan firms, however, prefer billing in US Dollars and Kenya Shillings only. 
The main problems reported by all firms were exchange rate risks, delay in transfer of funds and 
difficulties in obtaining confirmation of letters of credit.25 Therefore, the way forward for the EAC 
is to: 
1 Insist on more efficient banking transactions, particularly in these days of information 
and communication technology; 
2 Move fast towards the establishment of a common East African Shilling to eliminate 
local exchange rate risk; and 
3 Ensure the stability and convertibility of the common currency in order to guarantee 
confidence in it and forestall dollar preference. 
So long as there is dollar preference, there will be external dependence and debt accumulation. The 
creation of a regional currency will go a long way towards breaking this vicious cycle. As of now, 
the intra-trade payment mechanism is not particularly helpful in resolving the issue of external 
debt. 
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4.2 Monetary Policy and Budget Deficit 
It should be noted that large budgetary deficits lead to rising interest rates and inflation due to 
government borrowing to finance the deficit. This impacts negatively on balance of payments due 
to people preferring cheaper imports. It also discourages foreign investments due to the inherent 
macroeconomic instability the inflation creates. All these are factors that put pressure for external 
aid and borrowing and could lead to a debt crisis. Hence, macroeconomic stability is at a premium 
in any strategy of tackling the debt problem and peer pressure arising from a regional integration 
scheme is salutary. 
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The Impact of External Arrangements 
5.1 The EAC and other RECS 
One of the greatest challenges to the East African Community is the fact that its members are also committed to other, broader subregional arrangements. Table 5 gives the regional economic communities (RECs) to which Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda belong, aside from 
the EAC. 
Table 6: Regional Economic Community Memberships of EAC Countries 
COMESA COMESA FTA IGAD SADC 
Kenya - - -
Tanzania 
Uganda - -
COMESA :: Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa 
FTA :: Free Trade Area 
IGAD :: Intergovernmental Authority on Development 
SADC :: Southern African Development Community. 
As noted earlier, the EAC aims to have a customs union operational by December 2004 but, in the 
meantime, Kenya is a member of the free trade area (FTA) of the Common Market for Eastern and 
Southern Africa (COMESA). Launched on 31 October 2000, the COMESA FTA comprises nine 
countries - Djibouti, Egypt, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Sudan, Zambia and Zimbabwe 
- which practice duty free trade amongst them, i.e. no duties or charges of equivalent effect on 
goods originating from these countries. This is a typical case of variable geometry with varying 
speed tracks towards regional integration. Non FTA COMESA members are Angola, Burundi, 
Comoros, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Lesotho, Mozambique, Namibia, 
Rwanda, Swaziland, and Uganda. 
Such multiple REC membership has some intrinsic problems. It may allow a country to gain by 
'playing' on the differentials of timing; commitment and tariffs among various RECs and it could 
be a source of divided loyalty and policy reversals due to juggling with non-harmonised schedules 
of tariff reduction and membership contributions. The Southern Africa Development Community 
(SADC) proposes to establish a CU in 2008, four years after the EAC and COMESA, while IGAD 
typically follows the COMESA trade liberalisation and facilitation programme.26 The Regional 
Integration Facilitation Forum (RIFF) - successor to the Cross Border Initiative (CBI) of Burundi, 
Comoros, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Namibia, Rwanda, Seychelles, Swaziland, 
Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe - remains a credible framework for harmonised policies to 
facilitate a market driven concept of integration in East and Southern Africa. Otherwise, overlapping 
membership of RECs "reduces the potential trading gains from regionalism and undermines the 
improved investment climate that arises from larger markets"27 
5.2 Multilateral Institutions, SAPs and the EAC 
The World Bank SAPs, Special Programme of Assistance, IMF Enhanced Structural Adjustment 
Facility and stabilisation projects and Structural Adjustment Facility (SAF) are aimed at reducing 
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the actual debt burden mainly by reducing interest and providing new loans and credits. This occurs 
under the condition that the countries concerned execute the SAPs and austerity measures. It is 
commonly understood that the structural adjustments in East Africa were necessitated by 
unsustainable balance of payments and high budget deficits experienced by some EAC countries, 
mainly Tanzania and Uganda. 
Mkandawire and Soludo (1999 p88) concluded that the external debt of sub Saharan Africa, especially 
Uganda and Tanzania, has more than doubled over the adjustment period, without any increase in 
economic growth to sustain its servicing in the future. Africa's structural base and human capital 
formation, which were deemed to be fragile even at the beginning of adjustment, have deteriorated 
even further. The problems of structural adjustment are seen in that in the EAC, Uganda and Tanzania 
receive some preferential treatment from Kenya because it seems less indebted and more 
economically sound than its integration partners. The debt incurred under SAPs strongly and 
negatively affects economic growth, threatens the sustainability of reforms, and prevents the 
development of a capable and functioning state due to the fiscal crisis that it engenders. 
Tanzania's debt increased rapidly from US$ 2 257 million in 1980 to more than US$ 5 billion at the 
beginning of the 1990s. Tanzania's foreign debt stands at about US$ 7 billion. This makes it difficult 
to pursue regional economic convergence criteria for such a country in terms of lowering inflation 
levels and, controlling budget deficits and interest rates. It even compels governments to spend a 
third of their monthly revenue in debt service, while another third goes to civil servants payments 
and the balance is thinly spread over public operations and social services. Obviously, this leaves 
almost nothing for regional commitments. 
In spite of the adverse social dimensions accompanying the structural adjustment programmes 
(SAPs) that were forced down the throats of many African countries in the 1980s, some analysts 
have argued that the end result of price stabilisation, payments balance, democratisation, trimming 
of state apparatus, etc was conducive to a move towards convergence. Inadvertently, therefore, 
SAPs in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda made regional integration less difficult.28 
5.3 The HIPC Initiative and the EAC 
The EAC member countries have been identified among the 41 effectively insolvent, Heavily 
Indebted Poor Countries to benefit from the Bretton Woods Institutions' halfhearted attempt at debt 
cancellation - the HIPC initiative. 
Some debt relief initiatives have been undertaken for East Africa at various times. These include 
Official Development Assistance (ODA) debt cancellations, Paris Club rescheduling, and multilateral 
arrangements such as the concessional Extended Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF) and the 
Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative. To date, Uganda and Tanzania have qualified 
for HIPC assistance, the objective of which is to accommodate debt servicing within a country's 
ability to pay by providing debt relief. For instance, in 1998, Uganda was granted debt relief 
amounting to US$ 650 million, saving the country up to US$ 40 million per year up to 2003. 
Having qualified in January 2002 as a HIPC, Tanzania was granted debt cancellation of $ 190.75 
million from the African Development Bank (AfDB). However, it should be noted that the 
implementation of the existing debt relief mechanisms is slow and sometimes hesitant. 
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Table 7: Debt Service for Individual HIPC Countires in EAC (US$ million) 
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Tanzania 
Debt Service Paid 224 193 
Debt Service due after EHIPC 154 142 144 148 152 158 
Debt Service/Exports (%) 21 16 12 10 8 8 7 7 
Debt/Service/Government 
Revenue(%) 29 20 15 12 11 11 10 9 
Debt Service/GDP (%) 3 2 2 1 1 1 1 I 
Uganda 
Debt Service Paid 110 98 
Debt Service due after EHIPC 48 51 56 68 94 103 
Debt Service/Exports (%) 15 12 11 6 6 6 6 8 
Debt/Service/Government 
Revenue(%) 16 13 11 6 5 5 5 6 
Debt Service/GDP (%) 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Source: World Bank (2002) African Develpoment Indicators, Washington 
Although alleviated by the HIPC and other related arrangements the debt burden of countries like 
Uganda and Tanzania remained a serious impediment to progress and EAC economic integration. 
There is still an urgent need for deeper and wider relief. 
5.4 PRSPs and the EAC 
More recently, considerations such as essential spending on basic human needs, poverty alleviation 
and social services have brought to the fore the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) as the 
new financing mechanism, through Poverty Reduction Support Credit (PRSC) by the World Bank 
and the IMF's Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF). Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda are 
busy with this instrument. 
Its efficacy is yet to be seen, with many sceptics suspecting that PRSP is just a repackaged SAP/ 
reform conditionality of the Bretton Woods institutions. 
According to the agreement between the Tanzania government and the Bretton Woods Institutions 
(B Wis) under the HIPC initiative arrangements, debt service relief under the enhanced HIPC Initiative 
from all of Tanzania's creditors will amount to approximately US 3 billion over the next 20 years. 
The HIPC will reduce the net present value of Tanzania's total external debt by 54 percent. Uganda 
was under pressure from the World Bank and IMF to produce a PRSP within three months. This 
was because Uganda's qualification for the enhanced HIPC hinged on its being able to produce a 
PRSP. The donors' interest was a result of the international concern that HIPC was not working and 
that only a few countries had benefited. Uganda therefore became a showpiece for donors to stem 
the increasing tide of criticism.29 Thus in response both the donors and government had to work 
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hard to produce the first full PRSP in time for it to be presented to the Executive Boards of the 
BWIs at the spring meetings in April 2000. 
The contents of PRSPs continue to put corporate rights before and above social, human and 
environmental rights. Unequal power relations between the indebted poor countries and BWIs that 
manage the HIPC Initiative process and determine the contents through setting of the parameters, 
explain this distortion. However, what matters most for governments applying for PRSP decision 
and completion points status is the short term but badly needed cash flow from BWIs to finance the 
day to day business of their states. 
In a nutshell, regional integration appears to be associated with a reduction in the debt crisis. It also 
yields the institutional infrastructure to collectively bargain deals in the area of external debt. Some 
of the painful structural reforms the East African countries have undergone have facilitated a move 
towards convergence and hence integration, with the attendant softening of the debt crisis. 
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* 
On balance, the benefits of integrating exceed the benefits of not doing so and the benefit-cost ratio is positive.30 The emphasis needs to be, not in cutting costs/inputs (reductionist approach), but on generating more wealth/revenue/income (incrementalist approach). The 
bottom line of successful regional integration is in "providing equal opportunities, however unequal 
the initial endowment"31 and hence achieving together more than any one party could achieve 
alone, with the benefits outweighing the costs, even for the less advantaged members. 
6.1 Potential Costs and Benefits as applied to East Africa 
Some of the costs and benefits (shown in Table 8) are quantifiable; some are not and can only be 
'felt'. Some are short term in nature, while others take time to take effect due to their dynamics. It 
would be useful for the EAC to commission a comprehensive study to quantify all the costs and all 
the benefits of its integration, taking into account the various role players such as consumers, ordinary 
people, transporters and traders, investors, producers of goods and services, governments, etc. 
Table 8: Potential Benefits and Costs of Integration 
POTENTIAL 
BENEFITS/AREA 
POTENTIAL LOSS/ 
COST 
• Lower priced imports from partner, higher consumer surplus 
0 Greater variety of goods 
• Savings on real resources 
• Users of imported inputs may expand business (positive 
production effect) 
• Possible increase in exports to partners 
• Reduced cost of trading due to preferential access 
• Increased competitiveness on price and quality 
• Economies of scale due to larger market, lower unit costs 
• Spill over effects e.g transfer of know how 
• Pooling of investment resources for basis 'hard' and 'soft' 
regional infrastructure 
• Harmonised commercial policies, incentives, 
macroeconomic policies, leading to more development 
• Accelerated intraregional trade if comparative advantages 
are developed into complementarities in supply and demand 
• Bargaining power for bloc in global trading system 
• Employment generation 
• Increased productivity and exports to region and others 
• Local producers of similar 
goods may be competed 
out or temporari ly 
dislocated creating a 
negative production effect 
and loss of employment 
• Loss of tariff revenue from 
positive to zero tariff 
• Cost of enforcing rules of 
origin (FTA) 
• Higher priced imports 
from partner countries, 
loss of consumer surplus, 
reduced welfare 
• Local procucers under 
pressure 
• Loss of FDI if trade 
diversion arises (specific 
areas) 
Source: W. M. Lyakurwa, G.D. Mjema, L Rutasitara (2001), "A Regional Integrat ion Study of East Africa: 
Tanzania Country Report", 
Final Draft, ACEG, P.46 
The above suggests a win-win situation. Yet, the perceived 'costs' are real and need to be addressed. 
They include: 
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• Loss of sovereignty through denial of state discret]*f°°in fiscal and monetary policies as 
rules based strategies are put in place; and 
• The hustle to be competitive at the micro, meso and macro levels. 
Even as lower tariffs would lead to higher levels of compliance and higher trade volumes, fear of an 
immediate loss of tax revenue looms in many a policy maker's mind. But a close examination of 
this 'cost' shows that it is minimal. 
For example, in 1999/2000, "revenue from EAC trade accounted for a mere 0.4 percent of the total 
tariff revenue"32 In 1998, EAC-Tanzania import duty revenue was a mere 0.8 percent of total tax 
revenue and 2.6 percent of all taxes on her imports.33 As for Uganda, a few policy makers felt that 
there were no costs that were not already being experienced.34 In other words, people can live with 
the costs. The saying that it is not good to be 'penny wise but pound foolish' aptly applies. If tariffs 
are eliminated, a country can compensate for the loss in revenue by expanding the tax base and 
enhancing tax administration capacity to reduce avoidance and evasion. 
So, how are the costs and the benefits emanating from regional trade integration going to be shared 
among member states? Negotiations and research are afoot on this and it has been found that, 
The majority of the policy makers and implementers do not view the compensation of 
losers as a viable means of dealing with costs associated with the EAC...[and] the most 
popular mechanism suggested for compensation is surcharging of the imports causing the 
losses.35 
In this connection, given the differing initial conditions in terms of level of development in the 
three countries, the principle of asymmetry has been recognised by the EAC Treaty to address 
variances in the implementation of measures in an economic integration process.36 Consensus seems 
to emerge that, while the ideal remains zero EAC internal tariff, Uganda and Tanzania will be 
allowed a 10 percent surcharge on a small list of imports from Kenya for a limited period of time to 
protect their infant industries. This would definitely be less of a problem than a cumbersome and 
complicated compensatory mechanism. 
In short, it is should be noted that regional integration should not be not undertaken at any cost, but 
that associated benefits exceed the costs. In any case, the beneficiaries are willing to compensate 
the losers. The end result is that such an arrangement is good for addressing the debt crisis. 
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Debt and Human Development 
Using the Human Development Index (HDI) and debt crisis indicators, it is possible to determine the 'achievements' of integration in the socio economic sphere, including the debt crisis. The HDI incorporates real GDP measured using purchasing power parity (PPP), 
life expectancy at birth, and education at all levels. For an indicator of debt crisis, we use the debt 
service ratio as ? gauge of the country's capacity to bear stress. If a country has to pay in excess of 
25 percent of its export earnings annually to repay principal and pay interest on debt stock, thai 
country is experiencing debt overhang and its resources are really overstretched. This is the case in 
Kenya, although it is noteworthy that this ratio has fallen from 28 percent in 1996 to 27 percent in 
1999, as shown in Table 9. 
Table 9 Debt Service Ratio (%) 
1970 1980 1990 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Kenya - 21.0 35.4 27.1 32.9 30.3 27.8 22.3 21.2 26.7 
Tanzania - 21.2 32.9 26.9 19.0 17.9 19.1 13.2 20.9 15.5 
Uganda 3.0 17.3 58.9 65.0 43.2 20.0 20.0 18.5 24.3 23.7 
Source: World Bank, Global Development Finance 2001 
For Tanzania, the debt service ratio declined from 19 percent in 1996 to 16 percent in 1999 with a 
spurt in 1998. This ratio increased in the case of Uganda from 20 percent in 1996 to 24 percent in 
1999. In general, the debt service ratio for all countries was higher in the mid 1990s than at the end 
of the century. So, the formalisation of regional integration of the three had a marked decline in 
debt stress. 
An indication of the quality of life is given in Table 10. 
Table 10: Human Development Index 
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 1999 
Kenya 44.2 48.8 51.1 53.1 52.1 51.4 
Tanzania 42.2 42.7 43.6 
Uganda 38.4 38.6 40.2 43.5 
Source: UNDP, Human Development Report 2001, p. 147. 
Though still higher than the other two countries, human development has suffered quite some 
erosion in Kenya. Uganda was able to catch up with Tanzania that has more or less stagnated over 
the years. Overall, there are no significant distinct breaks in the observed HDI trends after the 
incidence of integration in 1996. This may be attributable to the fact that integration is quite recent 
so that there has not been enough time for it to take effect. 
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Recommendations 
The following recommendations can be drawn from the preceding study: 
• Proper management of the overlapping state memberships (EAC, COMESA, IGAD, 
SADC) needs to be addressed in a strategic planning fashion. It is recommended that the 
EAC explore self-financing mechanisms, such as a tax on trade or on a common resource, 
as a means of lessening dependence on outside funding. 
• A debt forum should be set up within the Community to classify existing debts as a basis 
for renegotiation and to enable member states to deal with creditors as a bloc, rather than 
as weak and impoverished individuals. A genuinely transparent and accountable process 
for agreeing new borrowing and discipline to decision making about borrowing should be 
developed within the EAC. The EAC countries could then set the conditions for debt 
reduction, or for new loans. 
• For the sake of the poor, and in the interests of democracy, the EAC should form a cartel 
that pushes shareholders of the IMF and World Bank to agree to creditors giving up their 
undisciplined monopoly over the international lending and borrowing process. The cartel 
should be composed of all major stakeholders in each country. 
• There is a need in East Africa to continue improving the macroeconomic policy environment 
and governance, to promote ownership of the process of formulating macroeconomic 
policies, and to adopt a regional approach to macroeconomic stability and a conducive 
environment to accelerate regional integration. 
• Any PRSPs that have been prepared with a national focus, without explicitly taking into 
account regional issues, external debt and regional integration should be revisited with 
the purpose of prioritising and ensuring that they promote debt reduction and regional 
harmonisation. 
• Mechanisms should be put in place to ensure the democratisation of economic decision 
making so as to end the sad and impoverishing cycle of lending, debt, default and corruption 
that has continued in countries like Kenya. 
a 
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Conclusion 
Though external debt has not formally featured as a regional integration policy issue, the latter has 
been found to be a means of achieving development, fighting indebtedness and enhancing the 
standard of life. 
In light of the potential costs and benefits of intraregional trade outlined in this paper, it is suggested 
that the emphasis be on wealth creation and strengthening the economies of the EAC members, 
rather than attempting reductionist cost cutting measures. A case in point is infrastructure 
development. Such developments are costly and necessitate borrowing, inevitably from outside 
sources. However, development of transport networks, telecommunications and the like has great 
potential to drag countries and regions out of poverty, enhancing their capacity to pay existing 
debts and lessening the need for future borrowing. 
Progress in regional integration is slow and seems to be haunted by the spectre of past failure. 
However, the macroeconomic convergence programme is on course. The convertibility of regional 
currencies already achieved has been found to encourage trade between member states because it 
obviates the need for the use of hard currencies. This can be expected to be further enhanced by the 
proposed introduction of a common currency by 2010. However, to optimise the benefits of a 
common currency, it will be necessary to increase actual levels of intraregional trade that are currently 
very low as a percentage of the total trade of the member countries. Improvement of services such 
as intrastate banking would facilitate this process. 
Proper management of the overlapping state memberships (EAC, COMESA, IGAD, SADC) needs 
to be addressed in a strategic planning fashion. It is recommended that the EAC explore self financing 
mechanisms, such as a tax on trade or on a common resource, as a means of lessening dependence 
on outside funding. It is further recommended that a debt forum be set up within the Community to 
classify existing debts as a basis for renegotiation and to enable member states to deal with creditors 
as a bloc, rather than as weak and impoverished individuals. 
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